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Abstract
We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat
voters with different characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we pro-
pose a set of six intuitive axioms and show that they jointly charac-
terize a new class of voting procedures, called Personalized Approval
Voting. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive
and finite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters
with the same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest
number of weighted votes is elected. Hence, the implemented voting
procedure reduces to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical
or the procedure assigns the same weight to all types.
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1 Introduction
Motivation There are many instances in which the members of a society
or an institution vote in order to take a decision and each voter’s impact on
the outcome depends on her/his underlying characteristics (type). Exam-
ples include the EU Member Council or the IMF Board of Directors, where
the weight of a country is determined by its population size or its stake,
respectively (see, Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix); management boards,
where the vote of the CEO tends to count double in case of a tie; or hiring
decisions in academic institutions, where the opinion of senior members is
usually given more weight. From a theoretical point of view, this implies
that voters are not treated equally and that existing axiomatic results on the
question of which voting procedure to implement do not directly apply. It is
consequently the aim of this study to complement the existing literature on
axiomatic voting theory by suggesting a general class of voting procedures
that is able to cover these kind of situations.
Plurality Voting is the most widely used voting procedure. According
to it, every individual is allowed to cast one vote and the alternative with
most votes is elected. One common critique of Plurality Voting is that it
may actually result in the election of the worst alternative for a majority of
individuals even in single–winner elections. As a simple example, consider
the case when there are three alternatives, two of which are very similar.
Then, if the votes for the two similar alternatives are distributed equally, the
third alternative may be elected even though a majority of the voters would
prefer either of the other two alternatives.
Approval Voting, introduced by Brams and Fishburn (1978), has been ex-
plicitly designed to overcome this drawback of Plurality Voting by allowing
individuals to vote for (or approve of) as many alternatives as they wish to.
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As usual, the alternative with most votes wins. Recent evidence from field
experiments by Laslier and van der Straten (2008) in France and Alo´s–Ferrer
and Granic´ (2011) in Germany has shown that Approval Voting modifies the
overall ranking of the candidates and that it tends to elect the candidate that
is most widely accepted in the population. This is the main reason why we
deviate from using Plurality Voting as a benchmark and frame our analysis in
the (more general and more complex) context when individuals can approve
any number of alternatives.
Characterization We are interested in general voting procedures that are
operable in different voting environments in which the set of voters and the
set of alternatives might vary. In particular, given a population of potential
voters and a conceivable set of alternatives, a voting procedure should specify
an outcome (a non-empty subset of the set of feasible alternatives) for every
electorate (the individuals that indeed vote) and every set of feasible alterna-
tives (the alternatives actually standing for election). We also assume that
voters are classified by types according to some exogenous characteristic. In
the examples of indirect democracy mentioned earlier, one can think of a
type as the number of people or the stake the voter represents. In problems
of decision making in small groups, the voter’s type could be associated with
her personal characteristics such as seniority or age.
In this setting, we consider a set of six intuitive properties. Consistency
in Alternatives, which is the analogue of Arrow’s Choice Axiom, states that if
the set of feasible alternatives is reduced but some of the originally elected al-
ternatives remain feasible, then exactly those alternatives have to be elected
in the new situation; Consistency in Voters, which requires that if two dis-
joint electorates select a common set out of two feasible alternatives, then
exactly this set has to be elected when the two electorates are assembled;
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Weak Anonymity, which means that voters with the same type have to be
treated equally; Neutrality, which is symmetry across alternatives; Faithful-
ness, which asks that if there is a single voter who approves x but not y, then
x has to be elected whenever x and y are the only two feasible alternatives;
and Continuity which states that no electorate is able to change completely
the result of the election when joint with a sufficiently large sequence of
electorates that all elect the same set of alternatives.
We show that these six properties fully characterize a general class of vot-
ing procedures that we will call Personalized Approval Voting. Each voting
procedure of this family is associated with a vector of strictly positive and
finite weights, one for each type of voter, and the winning alternative is the
one with the highest number of weighted votes. So, if the weight is the same
for all types, the voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting.
Related Literature Our work contributes to the existing literature on ax-
iomatic voting theory. Roberts (1991) was the first to characterize Plurality
Voting. Richelson (1978), Ching (1996), and Yeh (2008) also characterize
the Plurality Rule, but as a social choice correspondence and not as a vot-
ing procedure; that is, in these studies, the domain is the Cartesian product
of all linear orders on the set of alternatives. Fishburn (1978, 1979), Sertel
(1988), Baigent and Xu (1991), Goodin and List (2006) and Vorsatz (2007)
provide different characterizations of Approval Voting. Alo´s–Ferrer (2006)
shows that the properties in one of Fishburn’s characterizations are not inde-
pendent. Finally, Masso´ and Vorsatz (2008) and Alcalde–Unzu and Vorsatz
(2009) introduce classes of voting procedures that generalize Approval Vot-
ing in natural ways. In Masso´ and Vorsatz (2008), the neutrality property
is relaxed; in Alcalde–Unzu and Vorsatz (2009), the weight of a vote is a
decreasing function in the number of approved alternatives.
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Remainder In Section 2, we present basic notation and definitions. Section
3 introduces the axioms and presents the characterization result. In Section
4, we discuss some aspects of the procedures that we characterize. Finally,
the Appendix contains the proof of the characterization and the independence
of the axioms.
2 Notation and Definitions
We consider a setting with a variable set of voters and alternatives. Formally,
let X be a finite set of conceivable alternatives. Generic alternatives will be
denoted by x, y, and z; subsets of X by S and T . The cardinality of X ,
|X|, is greater than or equal to 3.1 The set of feasible alternatives K, the
alternatives that are actually standing for election, is a non–empty subset of
X . Our analysis focuses on the idea that the individuals participating in the
election may differ in their characteristics. To model this, we assume that
there is a finite set of types Θ = {1, 2, . . . , θ} and that for each type t ∈ Θ,
there is an infinite number of potential voters It. Hence, I ≡
⋃
t∈Θ It is
the population of all potential voters. The individuals actually participating
in the election, the electorate N , is a non–empty and finite subset of the
population I. We will also make frequent use of the capital letters A and B
to denote electorates.
For any individual i ∈ I, let Mi ∈ 2
X be the set of alternatives she
votes for. A profile M = (Mi)i∈I ∈ (2
X)I is a list of all votes. Given a
profile M and an electorate N , a response profile MN = (Mi)i∈N ∈ (2
X)N
is the n–tuple of votes coming from the electorate N at profile M . Given
1If there are only two conceivable alternatives, all the results of the paper hold true. The
unique difference is that, when |X | = 2, one of the axioms, Consistency in Alternatives, is
superfluous. This will become evident from the proof.
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the response profile MN , the number of votes x receives from the individu-
als of type t who belong to the electorate N is denoted by Gtx(MN ). Thus,
Gx(MN ) =
∑
t∈ΘG
t
x(MN ) is the total number of votes x gets at MN . Also,
let dtx,y(MN ) = G
t
x(MN )−G
t
y(MN) be the difference of the number of votes of
type t between alternatives x and y at MN . Finally, given two disjoint elec-
torates A and B and two response profiles MA and MB, denote the response
profile (Mi)i∈A∪B ∈ (2
X)A∪B by MA +MB.
Given a set of feasible alternatives K and an electorate N , a voting rule
vK,N : (2X)I → (2K \ ∅) selects for all profiles M a non–empty set of feasible
alternatives vK,N(M) with the property that for all M, M¯ ∈ (2X)I such that
MKN = M¯
K
N , v
K,N(M) = vK,N(M¯). We write vK(MN) instead of v
K,N(M).
A voting procedure {vK,N : (2X)I → (2K \ ∅)}K⊆X,N⊂I is a family of voting
rules, one for every set of feasible alternatives K and every electorate N . It is
denoted by v. Given the voting procedure v and a set of feasible alternatives
K, the subfamily {vK,N : (2X)I → (2K \ ∅)}N⊂I is denoted by v
K .
As we have already outlined in the Introduction, the main objective of
our study is to relax the anonymity assumption underlying Approval Voting.
One natural way to achieve this goal is to treat individuals with the same type
equally but to possibly discriminate between votes coming from individuals
of distinct types. The family we introduce next conceptualizes this idea by
assigning an exogenous weight to each type.
Definition 1 The voting procedure v is a Personalized Approval Voting if
there exists a vector of weights p = (p1, p2, . . . , pθ) ∈ R
θ
++ such that for all
sets of feasible alternatives K ⊆ X and all electorates N ⊂ I,
x ∈ vK(MN) if and only if
∑
t∈Θ
pt ·G
t
x(MN ) ≥
∑
t∈Θ
pt ·G
t
y(MN ) for all y ∈ K.
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We denote the Personalized Approval Voting associated with the vector of
weights p = (p1, p2, . . . , pθ) by vp. If p is such that ps = pt for all s, t ∈ Θ,
then all voters are treated equally and vp coincides with Approval Voting.
3 Axioms and Characterization
In this section, we are going to present a characterization of all Personalized
Approval Voting procedures. Since we allow in our analysis for a variable set
of feasible alternatives and voters, we necessarily need two consistency con-
ditions that establish how the selected set of alternatives adapts as either of
these changes. The first property states that if the set of feasible alternatives
is reduced and some of the alternatives that originally were selected remain
feasible, then exactly those have to be selected in the new situation.
Consistency in alternatives: The voting procedure v is consistent in
alternatives if for all feasible sets of alternatives S ⊂ T ⊆ X , all profiles
M ∈ (2X)I , and all electorates N ⊂ I such that vT (MN ) ∩ S 6= ∅,
vS(MN ) = v
T (MN ) ∩ S.
The property of consistency in alternatives is important because it allows
us to reformulate the question of which alternatives to choose from each
subset of alternatives to the question of how to order all alternatives of the
universal set X . To say it differently, the problems of constructing a social
choice function and a social welfare function become equivalent (see, Arrow
1959). This is the reason why we can restrict our attention in the remaining
five axioms to sets of feasible alternatives that only contain two alternatives.
The second consistency property, consistency in voters, says that if two
disjoint groups of voters elect some common alternatives from the set {x, y},
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then exactly those alternatives have to be elected if the two groups are joined.
This kind of property has been used in many characterizations of voting pro-
cedures and social choice functions; examples include, Smith (1973), Young
(1974), Hansson and Sahlquist (1976), Fishburn (1978), Richelson (1978),
Sertel (1988), Alo´s–Ferrer (2006), Masso´ and Vorsatz (2008), and Alcalde-
Unzu and Vorsatz (2009).
Consistency in voters: The voting procedure v is consistent in voters
if for all alternatives x, y ∈ X , all profiles M ∈ (2X)I , and all disjoint elec-
torates A,B ⊂ I such that v{x,y}(MA) ∩ v
{x,y}(MB) 6= ∅,
v{x,y}(MA +MB) = v
{x,y}(MA) ∩ v
{x,y}(MB).
The third condition, weak anonymity, relaxes the classical symmetry con-
dition according to which the result of the election should be invariant to
permutations of voters. Here, we only require this symmetry condition to
hold true if voters of the same type are permuted. Formally, two response
profiles MA and M
′
B are isomorphic relative to {x, y} if for all t ∈ Θ, there
is a permutation pit : It ∩A→ It ∩B such that Mpit(i) ∩ {x, y} = Mi ∩{x, y}.
Weak Anonymity: The voting procedure v is weakly anonymous if for all
alternatives x, y ∈ X and all response profiles MA and M
′
B that are isomor-
phic relative to {x, y},
v{x,y}(MA) = v
{x,y}(M ′B).
The next property, neutrality, is also a standard condition. It states that
if alternatives are permuted, then the set of elected alternatives has to be
permuted accordingly. Formally, given a permutation µ : X → X and a pair
of alternatives {x, y}, let µ(MN) and µ(v
{x,y}(MN )) be the response profile
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and the set of elected alternatives permuted according to µ.
Neutrality: The voting procedure v is neutral if for all alternatives x, y ∈
X , all profiles M ∈ (2X)I , all electorates N ⊂ I, and all permutations
µ : X → X ,
µ(v{x,y}(MN )) = v
µ({x,y})(µ(MN)).
So far, we have not introduced any kind of monotonicity condition which
insures that getting more votes is desirable. The following property is a weak
condition inspired by Fishburn (1978).
Faithfulness: The voting procedure v is faithful if for all individuals i ∈ I
and all alternatives x, y ∈ X ,
Mi = {x} ⇒ v
{x,y}(Mi) = {x}.
To introduce the last property, Continuity, consider an infinite number
of disjoint electorates such that all of them only select the same alternative
x from the set {x, y}. Suppose also that there is another electorate A, dis-
joint from the other electorates, for which y is the unique alternative elected
from the set {x, y}. The idea of continuity is that if a sufficient number of
electorates that elect x are joined together with A, then alternative x should
be elected (but not necessarily excluding y). In the literature, similar condi-
tions are found under the names of Archimedean Property or Overwhelming
Majority; see, Smith (1973), Young (1974, 1975), Richelson (1978), Myerson
(1996), or Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2009). This condition eliminates, for
example, dictatorship–like procedures that give an infinite weight to some
type t ∈ Θ of voters or procedures that break ties in a lexicographic way.
Continuity: The voting procedure v is continuous if for all alternatives
x, y ∈ X , all profiles M ∈ (2X)I , all successions of disjoint electorates {Np}
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such that v{x,y}(Np) = {x} for all p ∈ N, and any other electorate A for
which A ∩ Np = ∅ for all p ∈ N and v
{x,y}(MA) = {y}, there exists k ∈ N
such that
x ∈ v{x,y}(MN1 +MN2 + · · ·+MNk +MA).
Our main result state that these six properties fully characterize the set
of all Personalized Approval Voting.
Theorem 1 The voting procedure v is consistent in alternatives, consistent
in voters, weakly anonymous, neutral, faithful, and continuous if and only if
it is a Personalized Approval Voting.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
We also show that the six properties are independent.
Proposition 1 The properties in Theorem 1 are independent.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
The proof that the mentioned properties imply v to be a Personalized Ap-
proval Voting is constructive and divided into several steps. We now shortly
explain the structure of the proof (that is included in the Appendix) in order
to facilitate its reading.
1. It is shown in Lemma 1 that if one individual either approves both x
and y or neither of the two alternatives, then eliminating this individual
from the electorate does not affect the result of the election in case x
and y are the only two feasible alternatives.
2. Lemma 2 shows that that if x and y receive the same number of votes
from each type t ∈ Θ, then both alternatives have to be elected if they
are the only two feasible alternatives.
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3. Lemma 3 establishes that if alternatives z and w receive the same
number of votes from each type t ∈ Θ under the response profile M ′B
as alternatives x and y, respectively, under the response profile MA,
then (i) z is elected from the set {z, w} if and only if x is elected from
the set {x, y} and (ii) w is elected from the set {z, w} if and only if y
is elected from the set {x, y}.
4. We construct a binary relation % over vectors (x1, x2, . . . , xθ) ∈ N
θ,
interpreting each of the vectors as a possible combination of numbers
of votes from each type. The binary relation represents which combina-
tions of votes are better for an alternative to be selected by the voting
procedure.
5. With the help of Lemma 3 and step 4, we establish that the conditions
of Theorem 1 in Krantz et al. (1971) are satisfied. This allows us to
show that the subfamily v{x,y} is a Personalized Approval Voting.
6. Finally, we apply consistency in alternatives to show that, indepen-
dently of the number of alternatives, the voting procedure v is a Per-
sonalized Approval Voting.
4 Conclusion
We have characterized a voting procedure –a family of voting rules– that
generalizes Approval Voting for the cases when the society agrees not to treat
all voters equally. In particular, we have shown that a voting procedure is
consistent in alternatives, consistent in voters, weakly anonymous (i.e., only
voters with the same characteristics are necessarily treated in the same way),
neutral, faithful, and continuous if and only if there exists a strictly positive
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and finite weight for each type of voter and the alternatives with the maximal
sum of weighted votes are selected.
Since we characterize a large class of voting rules and therefore allow a
priori for a wide variety of discrimination between voters, there is the need to
discuss how the weights are ultimately determined. In particular, one needs
to identify first the relevant characteristics of the voters. Only afterwards
one has to decide how to weigh different voters.
In some cases of indirect democracy in which each voter represents a set
of citizens, the first step is not controversial: the classification should be done
in function of the number of people each voter represents. However, there is
a vast literature that discusses which weight each representative should have
as a function of her type. At a first sight, one would think that the weights
should be proportional to the number of people each voter represents. Yet, it
has been shown that this is probably not the best voting rule. Barbera and
Jackson (2006) characterize the efficient weights –the ones that maximize the
total expected utility–, which turn out to be different from the proportional
ones. Other authors have proposed also structures of weights in basis of other
criteria such as the equality of the probability of each person to be pivotal
in the election or the equality of the expected satisfaction of each person
with the outcome. See, for example, Laruelle and Valenciano (2008) for this
strand of the literature.
In many other cases the voters only represent themselves, yet it might
still be desirable to implement a discriminative voting rule. This is the point
where the discussion about which characteristics should determine the weight
clearly emerges. Even though it is impossible to provide a definite guideline,
one can look, for example, at elections in universities. In some of them, voters
are classified depending on their type of affiliation (students, administrative
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staff, professors, etc. ); in others, the classification is more detailed and also
considers other aspects such as seniority.
All in all, and independently of the more or less difficulty to define the
appropriate criteria to classify voters, our axiomatic study provides a theo-
retical background for the use of a Personalized Approval Voting procedure.
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Proof of the Theorem
It is easy to check that all Personalized Approval Voting procedures satisfy
consistency in voters, consistency in alternatives, weak anonymity, neutrality,
faithfulness, and continuity. The proof that these properties imply v to be a
Personalized Approval Voting follows the before-mentioned steps.
Lemma 1 If the voting procedure v is consistent in voters and neutral, then
for all alternatives x, y ∈ X, all profiles M ∈ (2X)I , all electorates N ⊂ I
and all voters i ∈ N such that Mi ∩ {x, y} ∈ {∅, {x, y}},
v{x,y}(MN) = v
{x,y}(MN\{i}).
Proof: Take any two alternatives x, y ∈ X , any profile M ∈ (2X)I , any
electorate N ⊂ I and any voter i ∈ N such that Mi ∩ {x, y} ∈ {∅, {x, y}}.
We are going to show first by contradiction that v{x,y}(Mi) = {x, y}.
Suppose that v{x,y}(Mi) = {x}. Consider the permutation µ : X → X
such that µ(x) = y, µ(y) = x and µ(z) = z for all z ∈ X \ {x, y}. Then, by
neutrality, µ(v{x,y}(Mi)) = v
µ({x,y})(µ(Mi)). Given that µ(v
{x,y}(Mi)) = {y},
that µ({x, y}) = {x, y} by definition of µ and that µ(Mi) = Mi, we have
that v{x,y}(Mi) = {y}. This is a contradiction. Since v
{x,y}(Mi) = {y} can
be excluded using a similar argument and since v{x,y}(Mi) 6= ∅ by definition,
we can conclude that v{x,y}(Mi) = {x, y}. Finally, v
{x,y}(MN\{i})∩{x, y} 6= ∅
implies that we can apply consistency in voters to obtain that v{x,y}(MN ) =
v{x,y}(MN\{i}). This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
The successive applications of Lemma 1 implies that given an electorate
N and any two alternatives x and y standing for election, it can be assumed
that all individuals belonging to N vote for one and only one of these two
alternatives (voters who do not declare a strict preference between x and y
16
can simply be discarded). Also note if Mi ∈ {∅, {x, y}} for all i ∈ N , then
both alternatives have to be elected by neutrality.
Lemma 2 If the voting procedure v is consistent in voters, weakly anony-
mous, and neutral, then for all alternatives x, y ∈ X, all profiles M ∈ (2X)I ,
and all electorates N ⊂ I such that Gtx(MN ) = G
t
y(MN) for all t ∈ Θ,
v{x,y}(MN ) = {x, y}.
Proof: Take any two alternatives x, y ∈ X , any profile M ∈ (2X)I , and any
electorate N ⊂ I such that Gtx(MN) = G
t
y(MN ) for all t ∈ Θ. By Lemma
1, we can assume that Mi ∩ {x, y} ∈ {{x}, {y}} for all i ∈ N . Partition the
electorate N into θ sub–electorates N1, . . . , Nθ in such a way that i ∈ Nt if
and only if i ∈ N ∩ It.
Consider any type t ∈ Θ for which |Nt| > 0. We are going to show by con-
tradiction that v{x,y}(MNt) = {x, y}. Suppose that v
{x,y}(MNt) = {x}. Take
the permutation µ : X → X such that µ(x) = y, µ(y) = x, and µ(z) = z for
all z ∈ X \ {x, y}. Then, by neutrality, vµ({x,y})(µ(MNt)) = µ(v
{x,y}(MNt)) =
{y}. Since µ({x, y}) = {x, y} by the definition of the permutation, the former
equation can be rewritten as v{x,y}(µ(MNt)) = {y}. Now observe that µ(MNt)
is an isomorphic copy of MNt relative to {x, y} because G
t
x(MN ) = G
t
y(MN)
by assumption. By weak anonymity, v{x,y}(MNt) = v
{x,y}(µ(MNt)) = {y},
which contradicts our initial assumption that v{x,y}(MNt) = {x}. A symmet-
ric argument proves that v{x,y}(MNt) 6= {y} and, therefore, we are able to
conclude that v{x,y}(MNt) = {x, y}.
Finally, using that
⋂
t∈Θ:|Nt|>0
v{x,y}(MNt) 6= ∅, the iterative application
of consistency in voters implies that
v{x,y}(MN ) = v
{x,y}

 ∑
t∈Θ:|Nt|>0
MNt

 =
⋂
t∈Θ:|Nt|>0
v{x,y}(MNt) = {x, y}.
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This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 3 If the voting procedure v is consistent in voters, weakly anony-
mous, and neutral, then for all alternatives x, y, z, w ∈ X, all profilesM,M ′ ∈
(2X)I , and all electorates A,B ⊂ I such that Gtx(MA) = G
t
z(M
′
B) and
Gty(MA) = G
t
w(M
′
B) for all t ∈ Θ,
x ∈ v{x,y}(MA)⇔ z ∈ v
{z,w}(M ′B) and y ∈ v
{x,y}(MA)⇔ w ∈ v
{z,w}(M ′B).
Proof: Take any four alternatives x, y, z, w ∈ X , any two profiles M,M ′ ∈
(2X)I , and any two electorates A,B ⊂ I such that Gtx(MA) = G
t
z(M
′
B)
and Gty(MA) = G
t
w(M
′
B) for all t ∈ Θ. By Lemma 1, we can assume that
Mi ∩ {x, y} ∈ {{x}, {y}} for all i ∈ N . Partition the electorate A into θ
sub–electorates A1, . . . , Aθ in such a way that i ∈ At if and only if i ∈ A∩ It.
Construct the electorates B1, . . . , Bθ in an identical manner.
For each type t ∈ Θ, partition the electorate At into two sub–electorates,
At1 and At2 , in such a way that exactly |d
t
x,y(MA)| individuals belong to At1
and all these individuals only vote for the alternative that receives more votes
atMA; that is, for all i ∈ At1 ,Mi∩{x, y} = {x} whenever G
t
x(MA) > G
t
y(MA)
and Mi ∩ {x, y} = {y} whenever G
t
x(MA) < G
t
y(MA) and, obviously, At1 = ∅
in case Gtx(MA) = G
t
y(MA). Then, At2 = At \ At1 . The electorates Bt1 and
Bt2 are derived from Bt in a similar fashion.
Consider the permutation µ : X → X such that µ(z) = x, µ(w) = y,
and that µ(s) = s for all s ∈ X \ {z, w}. Then, µ(M ′Btj ) and MAtj are
isomorphic relative to {x, y} for all t ∈ Θ and all j ∈ {1, 2}. Summing up
over all types we can see that the response profiles MA1 =
∑
t∈Θ:|At1 |>0
MAt1
and µ(M ′B1) =
∑
t∈Θ:|Bt1 |>0
µ(M ′Bt1 ) are isomorphic relative to {x, y}. By
weak anonymity,
v{x,y}(MA1) = v
{x,y}(µ(M ′B1)). (1)
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Also, we have that dtx,y(MAt2 ) = d
t
z,w(M
′
Bt2
) = 0 for all t ∈ Θ by the
way we partitioned the electorates. So, define MA2 =
∑
t∈Θ:|At2 |>0
MAt2 and
µ(M ′B2) =
∑
t∈Θ:|Bt2 |>0
µ(M ′Bt2 ) and apply Lemma 2 to see that
v{x,y}(MA2) = v
{x,y}(µ(M ′B2)) = {x, y}. (2)
Now, apply consistency in voters together with Equations (1) and (2) to see
that v{x,y}(MA) = v
{x,y}(MA1+MA2) = v
{x,y}(MA1) and that v
{x,y}(µ(M ′B)) =
v{x,y}(µ(M ′B1)+µ(M
′
B2
)) = v{x,y}(µ(M ′B1)). This, together with Equation (1),
implies that
v{x,y}(MA) = v
{x,y}(µ(M ′B)). (3)
Finally, consider the permutation µ−1. By neutrality, µ−1(v{x,y}(µ(M ′B))) =
vµ
−1({x,y})(µ−1(µ(M ′B))) = v
{z,w}(M ′B). This, together with Equation (3),
implies that µ−1(v{x,y}(MA)) = v
{z,w}(M ′B). Hence, x ∈ v
{x,y}(MA) if and
only if z ∈ v{z,w}(M ′B) and y ∈ v
{x,y}(MA) if and only if w ∈ v
{z,w}(M ′B). 
Next, consider the following binary relation % defined over Nθ × Nθ: for
all (x1, . . . , xθ), (y1, . . . , yθ) ∈ N
θ, (x1, . . . , xθ) % (y1, . . . , yθ) if there exists a
response profile MN and two alternatives x, y ∈ X such that x ∈ v
{x,y}(MN)
and for all t ∈ Θ, Gtx(MN ) = xt and G
t
y(MN ) = yt. Our objective is to show
that the triple (Nθ,%,+) is a closed extensive structure; that is, this triple
satisfies the following properties (see Krantz et al. 1971):
1. Complete preorder: % is a complete preorder over Nθ × Nθ.
2. Associativity: For all (x1, . . . , xθ), (y1, . . . , yθ), (z1, . . . , zθ) ∈ N
θ, we
have that (x1, . . . , xθ) + ((y1, . . . , yθ) + (z1, . . . , zθ)) ∼ ((x1, . . . , xθ) +
(y1, . . . , yθ)) + (z1, . . . , zθ).
3. Independence: For all (x1, . . . , xθ), (y1, . . . , yθ), (z1, . . . , zθ) ∈ N
θ, we
have that (x1, . . . , xθ) % (y1, . . . , yθ) ⇔ ((x1, . . . , xθ) + (z1, . . . , zθ)) %
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((y1, . . . , yθ)+(z1, . . . , zθ))⇔ ((z1, . . . , zθ)+(x1, . . . , xθ)) % ((z1, . . . , zθ)+
(y1, . . . , yθ)).
4. Archimedean: For all four (x1, . . . , xθ), (y1, . . . , yθ), (z1, . . . , zθ) and
(w1, . . . , wθ) ∈ N
θ, if (x1, . . . , xθ)  (y1, . . . , yθ), then there exists a pos-
itive integer t such that (t·(x1, . . . , xθ)+(z1, . . . , zθ)) % (t·(y1, . . . , yθ)+
(w1, . . . , wθ)).
Lemma 4 The triple (Nθ,%,+) is a closed extensive structure.
Proof: We show that the triple (Nθ,%,+) satisfies the conditions of Com-
plete Preorder, Associativity, Independence, and Archimedean.
Complete Preorder: To see that the binary relation % is well-defined,
take any (x1, . . . , xθ), (y1, . . . , yθ) ∈ N
θ and consider the response profiles
MA,M
′
B together with the alternatives x, y, z, w ∈ X such that G
t
x(MA) =
Gtz(M
′
B) = xt and G
t
y(MA) = G
t
w(M
′
B) = yt for all t ∈ Θ. We have to
establish that x ∈ v{x,y}(MA) ⇔ z ∈ v
{z,w}(M ′B) and that y ∈ v
{x,y}(MA) ⇔
w ∈ v{z,w}(M ′B). But this is exactly what we have shown in Lemma 3. Hence,
% is well-defined.
To show that the binary relation % is complete, note first that for any
(x1, . . . , xθ), (y1, . . . , yθ) ∈ N
θ, we can consider a response profile MN and
two alternatives x, y ∈ X such that for all t ∈ Θ, N ∩ It consists of xt
individuals voting only for alternative x and yt individuals voting only for
alternative y. This is always possible because It is an infinite set for all
t ∈ Θ. By definition of v, we have that v{x,y}(MN ) ∈ {{x}, {y}, {x, y}}.
Then, it follows from the definition of % that (x1, . . . , xθ) % (y1, . . . , yθ)
and/or (y1, . . . , yθ) % (x1, . . . , xθ). Hence, % is complete.
To see that% is transitive, take any (x1, . . . , xθ), (y1, . . . , yθ), (z1, . . . , zθ) ∈
N
θ such that (x1, . . . , xθ) % (y1, . . . , yθ) and (y1, . . . , yθ) % (z1, . . . , zθ). Con-
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sider any response profile MN and any three alternatives x, y, z ∈ X such
that for all t ∈ Θ, N ∩ It consists of xt individuals voting only for al-
ternative x, yt individuals voting only for alternative y, and zt individ-
uals voting only for alternative z. Since (x1, . . . , xθ) % (y1, . . . , yθ) and
(y1, . . . , yθ) % (z1, . . . , zθ) by assumption, the definition of % implies that
x ∈ v{x,y}(MN ) and y ∈ v
{y,z}(MN ). Suppose that transitivity is violated;
that is, v{x,z}(MN ) = {z}. Then,
(a) x 6∈ v{x,y,z}(MN ). If it was the case that x ∈ v
{x,y,z}(MN ), then, by
consistency in alternatives, we would have x ∈ v{x,z}(MN ). This con-
tradicts v{x,z}(MN) = {z}.
(b) y 6∈ v{x,y,z}(MN ). If it was the case that y ∈ v
{x,y,z}(MN ), then, by con-
sistency in alternatives, we would have y ∈ v{x,y}(MN). This, together
with the assumption x ∈ v{x,y}(MN ), would imply that v
{x,y}(MN ) =
{x, y}. Hence, by consistency in alternatives, x ∈ v{x,y,z}(MN ), which
contradicts case (a).
(c) z 6∈ v{x,y,z}(MN ). If it was the case that z ∈ v
{x,y,z}(MN ), then, by con-
sistency in alternatives, we would have z ∈ v{y,z}(MN). This, together
with the assumption y ∈ v{y,z}(MN ), would imply that v
{y,z}(MN ) =
{y, z}. Hence, by consistency in alternatives, y ∈ v{x,y,z}(MN), which
contradicts case (b).
The three cases together imply that v{x,y,z}(MN) = ∅. This is not possible
by definition and, therefore, we have reached a contradiction. Consequently,
% is transitive. Since the binary relation % is well-defined, complete, and
transitive, it is a complete preorder.
Associativity: The property holds because +, the usual addition operator
on vectors, is associative.
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Independence: Consider any triple (x1, . . . , xθ), (y1, . . . , yθ), (z1, . . . , zθ) ∈
N
θ such that (x1, . . . , xθ) % (y1, . . . , yθ). Take any profile M , any two dis-
joint electorates A,B ⊂ I, and any two alternatives x, y ∈ X such that
for all t ∈ Θ, Gtx(MA) = xt, G
t
y(MA) = yt, and G
t
x(MB) = G
t
y(MB) = zt.
Since (x1, . . . , xθ) % (y1, . . . , yθ) by assumption, the definition of % implies
that x ∈ v{x,y}(MA). Also, v
{x,y}(MB) = {x, y} by Lemma 2. By con-
sistency in voters, x ∈ v{x,y}(MA + MB). Given that G
t
x(MA + MB) =
xt + zt and G
t
y(MA +MB) = yt + zt for all t ∈ Θ, it follows from the def-
inition of % that (x1 + z1, . . . , xθ + zθ) % (y1 + z1, . . . , yθ + zθ). Hence,
as desired, ((x1, . . . , xθ) + (z1, . . . , zθ)) % ((y1, . . . , yθ) + (z1, . . . , zθ)) and
((z1, . . . , zθ) + (x1, . . . , xθ)) % ((z1, . . . , zθ) + (y1, . . . , yθ)).
Archimedean: Take any (x1, . . . , xθ), (y1, . . . , yθ), (z1, . . . , zθ), (w1, . . . , wθ)
belonging to Nθ such that (x1, . . . , xθ)  (y1, . . . , yθ). Consider any profile
M , any two alternatives x, y ∈ X , any electorate A ⊂ I, and any 0succes-
sion of disjoint electorates {Np}p∈N such that G
t
x(MA) = zt, G
t
y(MA) = wt,
v{x,y}(Np) = {x}, A ∩ Np = ∅, G
t
x(MNp) = xt and G
t
y(MNp) = yt for all
p ∈ N. By continuity, there exists k ∈ N such that x ∈ v{x,y}(MN1 +
. . . + MNk + MA). Since G
t
x(MN1 + . . . + MNk + MA) = k · xt + zt and
Gty(MN1 + . . . +MNk +MA) = k · yt + wt for all t ∈ Θ, we have, as desired,
that (t · (x1, . . . , xθ) + (z1, . . . , zθ)) % (t · (y1, . . . , yθ) + (w1, . . . , wθ)). 
Since the triple (Nθ,%,+) is a closed extensive structure, we can apply Theo-
rem 1 in Krantz et al. (1971) which guarantees that there exists a real-valued
function f over Nθ such that for all (x1, . . . , xθ), (y1, . . . , yθ) ∈ N
θ:
(i) (x1, . . . , xθ) % (y1, . . . , yθ)⇔ f(x1, . . . , xθ) ≥ f(y1, . . . , yθ) and
(ii) f((x1, . . . , xθ) + (y1, . . . , yθ)) = f(x1, . . . , xθ) + f(y1, . . . , yθ).
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Additionally, any other function g satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) if and only
if there exists t ∈ R++ such that g = t · f .
Using this result we construct the vector of weights p = (p1, . . . , pθ) by
setting f(1, 0, . . . , 0) equal to p1, f(0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) equal to p2, and so forth.
Since we know from condition (ii) that f(x1, . . . , xθ) = f(x1, 0, . . . , 0) +
f(0, x2, 0, . . . , 0) + . . .+ f(0, 0, . . . , xθ), we have that
f(x1, . . . , xθ) ≥ f(y1, . . . , yθ)⇔
θ∑
t=1
pt · xt ≥
θ∑
t=1
pt · yt.
Then, it follows from condition (i) and the definition of% that for all response
profiles MN and all alternatives x, y ∈ X ,
x ∈ v{x,y}(MN)⇔
θ∑
t=1
pt ·G
t
x(MN) ≥
θ∑
t=1
pt ·G
t
y(MN).
We also know from Faithfulness that pt > 0 for all t ∈ Θ and, therefore, we
have shown that the subfamily {vK}|K|=2 is a Personalized Approval Voting
with respect to the vector of weights p = (p1, p2, . . . , pθ). Consequently, it
remains to be shown that the vector of weights p = (p1, p2, . . . , pθ) is such
that for all sets of feasible alternatives K ⊆ X , independently of its size, all
response profiles MN ,
x ∈ vK(MN ) if and only if
∑
t∈Θ
pt ·G
t
x(MN ) ≥
∑
t∈Θ
pt ·G
t
y(MN ) for all y ∈ K.
Suppose first that x ∈ vK(MN). Then, by consistency in alternatives,
x ∈ v{x,y}(MN ) for all y ∈ K \ {x}. Since we already know that v
{x,y} is the
Personalized Approval Voting with respect to p = (p1, p2, . . . , pθ), it has to
be the case that
∑
t∈Θ pt ·G
t
x(MN) ≥
∑
t∈Θ pt ·G
t
y(MN ) for all y ∈ K.
Suppose now that
∑
t∈Θ pt · G
t
x(MN) ≥
∑
t∈Θ pt · G
t
y(MN ) for all y ∈ K.
Then, x ∈ v{x,y}(MN) for y ∈ K \{x} because v
{x,y}(MN ) is the Personalized
Approval Voting with respect to p = (p1, p2, . . . , pθ). If there is some z 6= x
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such that z ∈ vK(MN), then v
K(MN) ∩ {x, z} 6= ∅ and it follows from
consistency in alternatives that v{x,z}(MN) = v
K(MN) ∩ {x, z}. Since we
have already seen that x ∈ v{x,z}(MN ) it also has to be that x ∈ v
K(MN).
Finally, if there is no z 6= x such that z ∈ vK(MN ), then v
K(MN) = {x}
because vK(MN ) 6= ∅. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
Independence of the Axioms
We will finally establish the independence of the properties.
Consistency in Alternatives: Take any type t ∈ Θ. Let the voting proce-
dure v be equal to Approval Voting whenever the set of feasible alternatives
K contains exactly two alternatives; otherwise, apply the Personalized Ap-
proval Voting with weights pt = 1 and ps = 2 for all types s 6= t. This
procedure is consistent in voters, weakly anonymous, neutral, faithful, and
continuous. The following example shows that it is not consistent in alter-
natives.
Consider X = {x, y, z} and suppose that i ∈ Is and j ∈ It. If Mi = {x}
and Mj = {y}, then v
X(Mi + Mj) = {x} and v
{x,y}(Mi + Mj) = {x, y}.
Since vX(Mi + Mj) ∩ {x, y} 6= ∅, consistency in alternatives implies that
v{x,y}(Mi + Mj) = v
X(Mi + Mj) ∩ {x, y} = {x}. This contradicts that
v{x,y}(Mi +Mj) = {x, y}.
Consistency in Voters: Let the voting procedure v be equal to Approval
Voting whenever all individuals belonging to the electorate N are of the same
type; otherwise select all feasible alternatives. This procedure is consistent
in alternatives, weakly anonymous, neutral, faithful, and continuous. The
following example shows that it is not consistent in voters.
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Consider X = {x, y} and suppose that 1 ∈ Is and 2 ∈ It. If M1 =
M2 = {x}, then v
{x,y}(M1) = v
{x,y}(M2) = {x} and v
{x,y}(M1 + M2) =
{x, y}. Since v{x,y}(M1) ∩ v
{x,y}(M2) 6= ∅, consistency in voters implies that
v{x,y}(M1 +M2) = {x}. This contradicts that v
{x,y}(M1 +M2) = {x, y}.
Weak Anonymity: Assign to each individual i ∈ I a weight pi greater
than a strictly positive number . Also assume that pi > pj for some pair
i, j ∈ It for some t ∈ Θ. Let the voting procedure v be such that for all sets
of feasible alternatives K ⊆ X , all profiles M ∈ (2X)I , and all electorates
N ⊂ I, x ∈ vK(MN ) if and only if
∑
i∈N :x∈Mi
pi ≥
∑
i∈N :y∈Mi
pi for all
y ∈ K. This procedure is consistent in alternatives, consistent in voters,
neutral, faithful, and continuous. The following example shows that it is not
weakly anonymous.
Consider X = {x, y} and i, j ∈ It for some t ∈ Θ such that pi >
pj . If Mi = {x} and Mj = {y}, then v
{x,y}(Mi + Mj) = {x}. Now,
take any permutation pit : It → It such that pit(i) = j and pit(j) = i.
Then, v{x,y}(Mpit(i) + Mpit(j)) = {y}. Since weak anonymity implies that
v{x,y}(Mpit(i) +Mpit(j)) = v
{x,y}(Mi +Mj), this is a contradiction.
Neutrality: Assign to each alternative x ∈ X a strictly positive weight px.
Assume also that px > py for some x, y ∈ X . Let the voting procedure v be
such that for all sets of feasible alternatives K ⊆ X , all profiles M ∈ (2X)I ,
and all electorates N ⊂ I, x ∈ vK(MN ) if and only if px · Gx(MN) ≥ py ·
Gy(MN) for all y ∈ K. This procedure is consistent in alternatives, consistent
in voters, weakly anonymous, faithful and continuous. The following example
shows that it is not neutral.
Consider X = {x, y} and N = {i, j} and suppose that px < py. If
Mi = {x} and Mj = {y}, then v
{x,y}(MN ) = {y}. Now let the per-
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mutation µ : X → X be such that µ(x) = y and µ(y) = x. Then,
µ(v{x,y}(MN )) = {x} and v
µ({x,y})(µ(MN)) = {y}. Since neutrality implies
that µ(v{x,y}(MN )) = v
µ({x,y})(µ(MN )), this is a contradiction.
Faithfulness: Let the voting procedure v be such that for all sets of feasible
alternatives K ⊆ X , all profiles M ∈ (2X)I , and all electorates N ⊂ I,
vK(MN ) = K. This procedure is consistent in alternatives, consistent in
voters, weakly anonymous, neutral, and continuous. The following example
shows that it is not faithful.
Consider X = {x, y} and N = {i}. Suppose that Mi = {x}. Then,
v{x,y}(Mi) = {x, y}. However, faithfulness implies that v
{x,y}(Mi) = Mi ∩
{x, y} = {x}, which is a contradiction.
Continuity: Take any vector q = (q1, q2, . . . , qθ) of strictly positive weights
such that qi 6= qj for some i, j ∈ Θ. Let the voting procedure v be such that
for all sets of feasible alternatives K ⊆ X , all profiles M ∈ (2X)I , and all
electorates N ⊂ I, x ∈ vK(MN) if and only if (a) Gx(MN ) ≥ Gy(MN ) for all
y ∈ K and (b)
∑
t∈Θ qt ·G
t
x(MN) ≥
∑
t∈Θ qt ·G
t
y(MN ) for all y ∈ K such that
Gx(MN ) = Gy(MN ). This procedure is consistent in alternatives, consistent
in voters, weakly anonymous, neutral, and faithful. The following example
shows that it is not continuous.
Consider X = {x, y}, Is = {ji}i∈N, It = {ki}i∈N such that qs > qt.
Suppose that Mj = {x} for all j ∈ Is and Mk = {y} for all k ∈ It. Suppose
additionally that Ml = {y} for some l ∈ Iv, with v 6∈ {s, t}. Consider the
electorates Ni = {ji, ki} for all i ∈ N. By the definition of v, v
{x,y}(Ml) = {y}
and v{x,y}(MNi) = {x} for all i ∈ N. Consequently, continuity implies that
there is some b ∈ N such that x ∈ v{x,y}(MN1 + MN2 + . . . + MNb + Ml).
However, since Gy(MN1 +MN2 + . . .+MNb +Ml) > Gx(MN1 +MN2 + . . .+
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MNb +Ml) for all b ∈ N, v
{x,y}(MN1 +MN2 + . . . +MNb +Ml) = {y} for all
b ∈ N. This is a contradiction.
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EU Member State Population Weight
Germany 81,757,595 29
France 64,709,480 29
United Kingdom 62,041,708 29
Italy 60,397,353 29
Spain 46,087,170 27
Poland 38,163,895 27
Romania 21,466,174 14
Netherlands 16,576,800 13
Greece 11,125,179 12
Belgium 10,827,519 12
Portugal 10,636,888 12
Czech Republic 10,512,397 12
Hungary 10,013,628 12
Sweden 9,372,899 10
Austria 8,372,930 10
Bulgaria 7,576,751 10
Denmark 5,547,088 7
Slovakia 5,424,057 7
Finland 5,350,475 7
Ireland 4,450,878 7
Lithuania 3,329,227 7
Latvia 2,248,961 4
Slovenia 2,054,119 4
Estonia 1,340,274 4
Cyprus 801,851 4
Luxembourg 502,207 4
Malta 416,333 3
Table 1: Voting Weights in the EU Member State Council as of July 2011.
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IMF Board of Directors Percentage of Fund Weight
United States 16.77% 421,964
Japan 6.24% 157,025
Germany 5.82% 146,395
France 4.30% 108,125
United Kingdom 4.30% 108,125
Belgium (Austria) 4.98% 125,221
Mexico (Venezuela) 4.65% 117,053
Netherlands (Ukraine) 4.52% 113,822
Italy (Greece) 4.26% 107,077
Singapore (Indonesia) 3.94% 99,062
China 3.82% 95,999
Australia (Korea) 3.63% 91,347
Canada (Ireland) 3.61% 90,708
Denmark (Norway) 3.39% 85,352
Lesotho (Gambia) 3.22% 81,085
Egypt (Lebanon) 3.13% 78,692
India (Sri Lanka) 2.81% 70,705
Saudi Arabia 2.81% 70,595
Brazil (Colombia) 2.79% 70,188
Switzerland (Poland) 2.78% 69,842
Russian Federation 2.36% 60,194
Iran (Morocco) 2.27% 57,092
Argentina (Chile) 1.84% 46,335
Togo (Chad) 1.55% 39,039
Table 2: Voting Weights in the Board of Directors of the IMF as of July
2011. One voter tends to represent several countries, the only exceptions are
the United States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, China, and
the Russian Federation. For example, Argentina is grouped with Bolivia,
Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. In case the Argentinian representant is
absent, the Chilean representant replaces her/him. The exact categorization
can be consulted at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx.
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